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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

Case No. 920360-CA

:

DENNIS WAYNE SHUFFLER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to six
counts of Unlawful Dealing with

Property by a Fiduciary, a

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990) , and three counts of
Diversion or Appropriation of Insurance Funds, a violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-23-310(6) (1992).
felonies.

All counts were second degree

The trial court sentenced defendant to serve nine

consecutive 1 to 15 year terms of imprisonment.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court fail to consider the defendant's
history, character and rehabilitative needs during the sentencing
hearing.
The standard of review is that an appellate court will
not set aside a sentence imposed within statutorily prescribed

1

limits, unless the trial court's sentence

is either clearly

excessive or an abuse of discretion, State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d
885, 887 (Utah 1978), or unless the trial court fails to consider
all legally relevant factors, State v. Holland. 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1989) . An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of
the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if it can be
said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the
court. Gerrard. 584 P.2d at 887-888.
2.

Did the court abuse its discretion by sentencing the

defendant to serve the statutorily prescribed maximum of nine
consecutive 1 to 15 year terms of imprisonment?
The standard of review is that enunciated under 1.,
above.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The statutory provisions and rules upon which the State
relies are included in appendix of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information on February 20, 1992 with
six counts of Unlawful Dealing with Property by a Fiduciary, and
three counts of Diversion or Appropriation of Insurance Funds, §§
76-6-513

and

31A-23-310(6).

All

counts were

second

degree

felonies.
On March 4, 1992, pursuant to a plea negotiation contained in
the "Statement of Defendant" (R. 21-29), defendant entered pleas of
guilty to each of the nine counts charged in the information.
After the preparation of a presentence report, defendant appeared

2

for a sentencing hearing on April 29, 1992. Upon conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve nine 1 to 15
year terms of imprisonment.

The court ordered that all terms run

consecutively. A final judgment was entered in the Sixth Judicial
District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah, on May 28, 1992
(R. 40-41).
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 4, 1992.
present appeal

challenges the sentence imposed

The

as excessive,

alleging abuse of discretion by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At the time of sentencing, defendant was 41 years old (R. 46,
hereinafter, Tr. 22), and had lived in the Manti area of Sanpete
County since he was a young boy (Tr. 25-26) . He was employed as a
police officer in the community for five years (Tr. 8, 28) . During
the time in which the offenses occurred, defendant was selfemployed as an insurance agent, a tax adviser, and was trusted by
victims as an investment counselor (Tr. 9, 19-21, 22, 27).
Defendant represented to victims that he could invest their
money in insurance annuities, life insurance policies, TELCO (a
telephone company), and living trusts (Tr. 14, 17, 19, & 20).
Defendant did not invest the victim's money as he had represented
(Tr. 10-27) . Large amounts of money were entrusted to him to make
these investments.
to $115,000

The amounts varied from approximately $20,000

(Tr. 12, 17, & 21).

Several of the victims were

widowed and elderly (Tr. 12, 21, & 26).

In some cases, the monies

invested by victims represented life savings or retirement funds

2

(Tr. 17, 26).
In order to create the appearance that monies were invested as
defendant had represented to his client/victims, defendant paid
some of the victims monthly interest payments (Tr. 10# 33).
Defendant also used investment monies and insurance funds for
business

expenses

and

seminars

(Tr. 11, 25) .

The offenses

committed by defendant occurred over approximately a seven year
period (Tr. 15). Because defendant never placed these funds into
requested insurance policies or annuities, or invested in any of
the proposed entities, the monies were eventually exhausted (Tr.
10-11).
After the funds were depleted, several victims began asking
defendant what held happened to their money (Tr. 12-13) . One of the
victim's

daughters-in-law

made

a

complaint

to

the

Sheriff's

Department and later told defendant that she was going to the
authorities (Tr. 13) .

Defendant eventually gave information to

investigators regarding the diverted client-funds and was charged
with the offenses which support the sentence at issue (Tr. 27-28).
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that
it had read the presentence report

(Tr. 3, 13, 41).

Adult

Probation & Parole (AP&P) recommended in the report that defendant
serve nine consecutive terms (Tr. 7, 29) . The court also indicated
that it had read the victims' statements in the presentence report
(Tr. 13) .

The court heard the sentencing recommendations of the

State

defendant's

and

counsel,

statement (Tr. 5, 27, 32).

and

listened

to

defendant's

Six victims and defendant's ex-wife

A

also made statements to the court (Tr. 10)

At the conclusion of

the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the maximum term of
incarceration prescribed by statute, and explained to defendant the
reason for the sentence (Tr. 41) . The court stated the following:
The sentences will run consecutively, Mr. Shuffler. I
am intending to impose the maximum penalty and I do impose
the maximum penalty, as I can. And I want to explain to
you the reason why I do that, for your benefit and for the
benefit of the victims.
From what I have seen in the presentence report and
what I have heard from you today leads me to conclude that
you are not a trustworthy person. And the glue that binds
a community together is the belief that we all have that [sic]
we can trust each other and that most people will be obedient,
and you violated that trust on behalf of these people who are
here today.
And what you've told me about your bankruptcy proceedings
concerns me because you're telling me that you have not been
honest with the Bankruptcy Court. And you're required to do
that in order to get a surcharge [sic] from the Bankruptcy
Court and your comments lead me to believe that you're still
not a trustworthy person, inspite [sic] of what's happened to
you so far.
(Tr.41-42).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court exercised proper discretion in sentencing
defendant to serve the maximum term prescribed.

Defendant was

afforded a fair opportunity to express his position both orally and
in writing. Defendant made statements to AP&P which were provided
to the court in the presentence report. The court also considered
defendant's oral statement in court, wherein defendant disagreed
with

some

of

the

recommendations

made

by

victims

and

the

prosecution.
The

court

considered

substantial

information

regarding

defendant's history, character and rehabilitative needs. The court

£

heard statements that defendant was well known; that he had lived
in the community since he was a young boy; that he was a former
police officer; and, that he was highly respected and trusted in
the community prior to these offenses.
The

court

considered

alternative

means

of

punishment,

restitution and rehabilitation. Defendant stated that he could pay
restitution to all of the victims. Defendant's counsel recommended
that defendant be sentenced in such a way as to provide for
restitution to the victims.
The record demonstrates that the trial court objectively
considered all of the information provided in the presentence
report and at the sentencing hearing.

The sentence was imposed

within statutory limitations, was not inherently unfair, excessive
or an abuse of the court's discretion, and was justified by the
evidence, history and circumstances presented to the court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED DEFENDANT'S
HISTORY, CHARACTER AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS
DURING THE SENTENCING HEARING.
Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by
failing

to

consider

rehabilitative needs.

defendant's

history,

character

and

The record does not support defendant's

argument.
An abuse of discretion may occur where the actions of the
sentencing court are inherently unfair. Gerrard. 584 P.2d at 887-

£

888 • The statutory factors the court is to consider in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences are

"the gravity and

circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401
(2).
In the instant case, the court considered information from a
lengthy presentence report.

At the sentencing hearing, the court

heard statements and recommendations from the prosecution, the
victims, defendant's wife, defendant's attorney, and defendant.
The following facts were presented at the sentencing hearing:
1.

Defendant was well known and lived in the community

since he was a young boy (Tr. 25, 28);
2.

Defendant was a missionary and helped one of the victims

with church activities while he was a juvenile (Tr. 25);
3.

Defendant was charitable in his community (Tr. 25);

4.

Defendant

was employed

as a police officer

in the

community for approximately five (5) years (Tr. 8, 28);
5.

Defendant worked as an investment counselor and tax

adviser (Tr. 9, 19-21, 22, 27);
6.

Defendant cooperated with the investigation and provided

information to the prosecution (Tr. 5, 27, 30);
7.

Defendant believed he had the ability to pay restitution

to the victims (Tr. 33);
8.

Defendant's wife believed he was trying to pay victims

back, prior to the charges being filed (Tr. 24);
9.

Defendant represented to client/victims that he would

2

invest their monies in TELCO, a living trust, insurance
policies and annuities (Tr. 14, 17, 18, 20);
10.

Defendant made false representations and diverted the

funds of client/victims over a period of approximately seven
(7) years (Tr. 15);
11.

Some of the victims entrusted defendant with their life

savings (Tr. 14, 17-18, 26);
12.

Many of the victims were elderly and are now unable to

support themselves due to defendant's diversion (Tr. 16, 17,
26); and
13.

Defendant had recently filed bankruptcy, and was not

honest when providing creditor information to the court (Tr.
42) .
Although the trial court did not specifically address the
rehabilitative needs of defendant during the sentencing hearing, it
is clear that the court considered various punishment alternatives.
Additionally, it should be presumed that the rehabilitative needs
of defendant were appropriately considered in the presentence
report. State v., Eloge. 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988) . In Elocre. the
supreme court stated that

ff

[a]bsent a record, this Court presumes

regularity in the proceedings below.11

762 P.2d at 2 [citing State

v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)].

Since defendant has

not made the presentence report part of the record, he may not
claim that the report did not consider rehabilitative factors in
determining his sentence.
Because the trial court considered all of the above factors
&

and circumstances before imposing defendant's sentence, including
the information and recommendation contained in the presentence
report,

defendant's

sentence does not

represent

an abuse of

discretion.
POINT II
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS
WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE,
WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DOES NOT REPRESENT AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Defendant may have believed at his sentencing hearing that the
court would impose a short term of incarceration and then place him
on probation.

In fact, defendant stated on two occasions during

the hearing that he was prepared for incarceration, believed
imprisonment was appropriate, but should not be "the end result"
(Tr. 33, 34). Defendant also believed that he had the ability to
pay restitution to the victims if placed on probation (Tr. 34) .
Nevertheless, the court sentenced defendant to serve the maximum
sentence possible, nine consecutive 1 to 15 year terms.
In State v. Clark. 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981) , the supreme court
noted that lenient treatment is sometimes afforded for first time
offenders, "[b]ut clearly there is no principle recognized in a
court of law that one who would break the law is entitled to a free
bite of the apple or to be treated leniently."

I£. at

845.

The matter of sentencing rests entirely within the discretion
of the trial court, as long as it is imposed within the limits
prescribed by law. State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843, 887 (Utah 1986) .
Before an appellate court may overturn a sentence imposed by the
trial court, "it must be clear that the actions of the judge were

1

so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion."
Gerrard. 584 P.2d at 887. Any other standard of review would place
a chilling effect on the trial court. Ibid.
It appears that the trial court imposed the msLximum sentence
based on its findings that defendant violated the community's trust
and remained untrustworthy at the time of sentencing; that many of
the victims were elderly and as a result of defendant's crimes,
were no longer aible to support themselves financially; and, that
many victims would never receive any restitution.

Considering

these factors, the sentence imposed by the trial court was not
excessive or so clearly unfair as to constitute an abuse of
discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial
court's sentence in this case.
DATED this _5r£\ day of December, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

v

By:

ROBERT C. CtJRNEN

Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX

PUNISHMENTS

76-3-401

or affected by the con victioi •
..
m
nated media or otherwise.
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a corporation or association is convicted of an offense committed in furtherance of the affairs of the
corporation or association, the court may include in the sentence an order
disqualifying him from exercising similar functions in the same or other corporations or associations for a period of not exceeding five years if it finds the
scope or willfulness of his illegal actions make it dangerous or inadvisable for
such functions to be entrusted to him,
History: C. 1953, 76-3-303, enacted by L
1073, ch. 196, § 76-3-303.
I UH'liAl

HFFF-RENrF'-i

Key Numbers. — l'run in u I 1 HV. «•' VMH 1I

PART 4
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON
SENTENCES
tions.
• roun shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than une felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years' imprisonment. However, this
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of
them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction.
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons shall treat the defendant as
though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
67

76-3-401

CRIMINAL CODE

(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences rim consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7;
1989, ch. 181, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, deleted "Subject
to the limitations of Subsections (2) through
(5)" at the beginning of Subsection (1); inserted
'Tor state offenses" in the second sentence in
Subsection (1); rewrote the first sentence in
Subsection (4) which read "If a court lawfully
determined to impose consecutive sentences,
the aggregate minimum of all sentences imposed may not exceed twelve years' imprisonment and the aggregate maximum of all sen-

tences imposed may not exceed thirty years'
imprisonment"; inserted "a maximum sentence
of5 before "life imprisonment" at the end of the
second sentence in Subsection (4); rewrote Subsection (61 following "single term" which read
"with the following incidents, (a) The prison
term shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms; and (b) The minimum term, if any, shall constitute the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms";
added Subsections (8) and (9); and made numerous stylistic changes throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
and after the sexual assault, in which the victim was restrained against her will and subCommencement of second sentence.
jected to a substantial risk of harm from the
defendant's threats and loaded gun. State v.
Consecutive sentences.
Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986).
Sentences imposed by different states.
Trial CDurt did not err in imposing four conCommencement of second sentence.
secutive sentences for second-degree murder,
Sentence upon conviction of second offense attempted murder and two counts of aggracould not begin later than termination of first; vated assault arising out of a barroom altercacourt properly sentenced defendant to serve ad- tion, because defendant committed four sepaditional five years on conviction of perjury, to rate and distinct crimes involving different viccommence upon expiration of life sentence tims. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. App.
which defendant was already serving. State v. 1989).
Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967).
Sentences imposed by different states.
Consecutive sentences.
Subsection (1), providing that sentences are
The court did not err in imposing consecutive to run concurrently unless the court states to
sentences on the defendant for the crimes of the contrary in the sentence, does not apply to
aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault, sentences imposed by two different sovereigns,
even though both were committed in the course and, therefore, such sentences should run conof a single criminal episode, where the evi- secutively unless the sentencing court exdence clearly showed that a sufficiently sub- pressly directs otherwise. State v. Reed, 709
stantial period of time had elapsed, both before P.2d 391 (Utah 1985).
ANALYSIS

68

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

#v

• 1 6 -6 515

Unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary.

(Ij, ^ person is guilty of theft, punishable under Section 76-6-412, if he
deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property
of the government or of a financial institution, in a manner which he knows is
a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of loss to the owner
or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.
(2) As used in this section 'fiduciary" includes any person carrying on fiduciary functions on behalf of a corporation or other organization which is a
fiduciary. "Government" and "financial institution" have the meanings given
in Section 76-6-411; "property" has the meaning given in Section 76-6-401(1).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-513, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-513; 1983, ch. 91, * 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 76-6-411, re-

ferred to in Subsection (2), was repeated in

COI LATER i I. I REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia-

3 6 6 •51II I i

bility: A Guide for Lawyers nil Il lhi*>< Ini '•,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 847.

Bi ibc i ' 3 or threat b i influence eoiu« -

A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
(1) With a purpose to influence any participant or prospective partici
pant not to give his best efforts in a publicly exhibited contest, he confers
or offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to a
participant or prospective participant; or
(2) With a purpose to influence an official in a publicly exhibited contest to perform his duties improperly, he confers or offers or agrees to
confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to such official; or
(3) With a purpose to influence the outcome of a publicly exhibited
contest, he tampers with any person, animal, or thing contrary to the
rules and usages purporting to govern the contest; or
(4) He knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit, the
giving of which would be criminal under [Subsection] (1 ) or (2).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-514, enacted by L,
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-514
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
An. Jur. 2d
fi I ft

!

12 Am. Jur 2d Brihe'

S. - 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 2.
^i mbers
Bribery «-» 2

76-6-515. Using en making slugs.
(] ) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(a) With a purpose to defraud the supplier of property or a service
offered or sold by means of a coin machine, he inserts, deposits, or uses a
slug in that machine; or
(b) He makes, possesses, or disposes of a slug with the purpose of enabling a person to use it fraudulently in a coin machine
197

INSURANCE MARKETING

31A-23-310

31A-23-309. Representations of agency.
No person may represent himself as the agent of an insurer unless a written
agency contract is in effect giving the person authority from the insurer.
History. C. 1953, 31A-23-309, enacted by
k 1985, ch. 242, § 28.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
QJJS. — 44 C J.S Insurance § 145 et seq.

31A-23-310. Trust obligation for funds collected.
(1) Every agent or broker is a trustee for all funds received or collected as
an agent or broker for forwarding to insurers or to insureds. Except for
amounts necessary to pay bank charges, and except for funds paid by insureds
and belonging in part to the agent or broker as fees or commissions, no agent
or broker may commingle trust funds with his own funds or with funds held in
any other capacity. Except as provided under Subsection (4), every agent or
broker owes to insureds and insurers the fiduciary duties of a trustee with
resj>ect to money to be forwarded to insurers or insureds through the agent or
broker. Unless the funds are sent to the appropriate payee by the close of the
next business day after their receipt, the licensee shall deposit them in an
account authorized under Subsection (2). Funds so deposited shall remain in
an account authorized under Subsection (2) until sent to the appropriate
payee.
(2) Funds required to be deposited under Subsection (1) shall be deposited:
(a) in a federally insured trust account with a financial institution
located in this state; or '
(b) in some other account, approved by the commissioner by rule or
order, providing safety comparable to federally insured trust accounts.
(S) It is not a violation of Subsection (2)(a) if the amounts in the accounts
exceed the amount of the federal insurance on the accounts.
(4) A trust account into which funds are deposited may be interest bearing.
Except as provided under Subsection 31A-23-307(2)(b), the interest accrued on
the account may be paid to the agent or broker, so long as the agent or broker
otherwise complies with this section and with the contract with the insurer.
(5) No financial institution or other organization holding trust funds under
this section may offset or impound trust account funds against debts and
obligations incurred by the agent or broker.
(6) Any licensee who, not being lawfully entitled thereto, diverts or appropriates any portion of the funds held under Subsection (1) to his own use, is
guilty of theft under Part 4 of Chapter 6, Title 76. Section 76-6-412 applies in
determining the classification of the offense. Sanctions under Section
31A-2-308 also apply.
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-310, enacted by
L. 1085, ch. 242, § 28; 1986, ch. 204, $ 201.
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